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Abstract
When players may have lexicographic utilities, there are: (i) extensive games having a
non−empty set of equilibria but empty sets of sequentially rational, sequential and perfect
equilibria; (ii) normal form games having a non−empty set of equilibria but an empty set of
proper equilibria and no stable set of equilibria; and (iii) two extensive games having the
same normal form representation and disjoint sets of sequential equilibria.
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1. Introduction 
 
Fishburn (1972) shows that finite two-person zero-sum games may have no equilibrium 
if players’ preferences are not represented by the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities but by lexicographic (non-Archimedean) utilities; for lexicographic orders and 
lexicographic expected utility, see Hausner (1954), Thrall (1954) and Fishburn (1974). 
 
Call “GT1 ” the theory of non-cooperative games having von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities (the “standard” game theory) and “GT2 ” the theory of non-cooperative games 
having lexicographic utilities. The significance of Fishburn’s result lies in discovering 
the existence of a gap between GT1  and GT2 , namely, that the basic existence theorem 
in GT1 , due to Nash (1951), according to which every game possesses at least one 
equilibrium in mixed strategies, does not hold in GT2 . This note tries to contribute to 
measure the separation between GT1  and GT2  by identifying four additional 
fundamental results in GT1  that fail in GT2 . 
 
The four results are the following. First, that every extensive game with perfect recall 
possesses a sequential equilibrium; see Kreps and Wilson (1982). Second, the 
sufficiency of the normal form principle, according to which all that is necessary to 
solve an extensive game is in its normal form representation; see Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986, pp. 1010-1012) and Myerson (1991, pp. 50-51). Third, that every perfect 
equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium; see Selten’s (1975) Proposition 5. And fourth, 
that a proper equilibrium of a reduced normal form is sequential in any extensive game 
with that normal form; see Proposition 0 in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1009). 
 
Section 2 shows that games with lexicographic utilities may have equilibria none of 
which satisfies the weak requirement of being sequentially rational (prescribing best 
replies at every information set). Section 3 shows that a game with lexicographic 
utilities having an empty set of sequentially rational equilibria may turn out to have 
some by inflating a player’s information set and, simultaneously, preserving the normal 
form representation. Thus, if being sequentially rational is necessary for an equilibrium 
to be reasonable, two different games in GT2  with the same normal form representation 
may have completely different sets of reasonable equilibria. Section 4 shows that, in an 
extensive game with lexicographic utilities, a perfect equilibrium need not be sequential 
and, moreover, that a proper equilibrium of its normal form representation need not 
induce a sequential equilibrium in the original extensive game. Section 5 discusses an 
expected utility version of the game with lexicographic utilities that yields the above 
results as well as ways of trying to solve the difficulties these results express. − 2−  
2. Result I: non-empty set of equilibria but empty set of 
sequentially rational equilibria 
 
Consider the extensive game with lexicographic utilities G1  represented as Figure 1, 
where player 2’s utilities are lexicographic (two-dimensional) utilities that are ordered 
by the lexicographic order ≥ L such that (x, y) ≥ L (x', y') if, and only if, x > x' or (x = x' 
and y ≥  y'), with (x, y) > L (x', y') if, and only if, (x, y) ≥ L (x', y') and not (x', y') ≥ L (x, y). It 
then follows that (1, 2) > L (1, 1) > L (0, 0). In G1 , while players 1 and 3 try to maximize 
standard expected utility, player 2 tries to maximize lexicographic expected utility. 
 
 
Fig. 1                  Fig. 2 
 
Solution-concepts in GT1  can be defined for G1  by retaining the original formulation for 
players with standard utilities and by inserting the order ≥ L for players with 
lexicographic utilities. For strategy profile σ  and pure strategy s ∈  {a, b, c, d, e, f}, let 
σ s denote the probability that σ  assigns to s. 
 
Remark 2.1. Every equilibrium σ  of G1  is such that σ a = σ e = 1 and 0 ≤ σ c ≤  ½. 
 
It is easy to verify that (a, d, e) is the only pure-strategy equilibrium in G1 . Let σ  be a 
strategy profile of G1 . Case 1: 0 ≤ σ a < 1. Then choosing c yields player 2 expected 
lexicographic payoff σ bσ e(1, 2), whereas choosing d yields σ b(1, 1). If σ e < 1 then 
player 2’s lexicographic best reply is d, in which case player 1’s best reply is a, so σ  
with σ a < 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If σ e = 1 then player 2’s lexicographic best reply 
is c, in which case player 3’s best reply is f and σ  with σ e = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. 
As a result, no profile σ  in G1  such that 0 ≤ σ a < 1 is an equilibrium. Case 2: σ a = 1. 
Then player 3’s best reply is e and to make a a best reply for player 1 given σ e = 1, σ c 
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Define strategy profile σ  to be sequentially rational if, at every information set h, some 
probability distribution over the nodes of h makes the strategy that σ  prescribes at h a 
best reply to what σ  prescribes after h. 
 
Remark 2.2. No equilibrium of G1  is sequentially rational and, therefore, the set of 
sequential equilibria of G1  is empty. 
 
By Remark 2.1, in every equilibrium σ  of G1 , σ e = 1 and 0 ≤ σ c ≤  ½. As (1, 2) >L (1, 1), 
player 2’s only lexicographic best reply to e at 2’s information set consists of choosing c 
with probability 1, so G1  has an empty set of sequentially rational equilibria and, hence, 
no sequential equilibrium. Consequently, Remarks 2.1 and 2.2 prove the following. 
 
Proposition 2.3. There are extensive games with lexicographic utilities having a non-
empty set of equilibria but having both an empty set of sequentially rational equilibria 
and an empty set of sequential equilibria. 
 
 
3. Result II: insufficiency of the normal form 
 
Consider now the game with lexicographic utilities G3  represented as Figure 3. Game 
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Remark 3.1. G3  has the same set of equilibria as G1 : strategy profile σ  is an equilibrium 
of G3  if, and only if, σ a = σ e = 1 and 0 ≤ σ c ≤  ½. 
 
Remark 3.2. G1  and G3  have both the same (reduced) normal form representation. 
 
Remark 3.3. Every equilibrium of G3  is a sequential equilibrium. 
 
In fact, every equilibrium σ  of  G3  generates a sequential equilibrium with beliefs 
ascribing probability 1 to node x, probability σ c to node y and probability 0 to node z. 
Accordingly, Remarks 2.2, 3.2 and 3.3 prove the following result. 
 
Proposition 3.4. There are extensive games G  and G' with lexicographic utilities having 
the same (reduced) normal form representation with no equilibrium being sequential in 
both G  and G'. 
 
By Proposition 3.4, the respective extensive forms of G1  and G3  cannot be regarded as 
different presentations of the same decision problem: the fact that in G1 , in contrast to 
G3 , player 2 realizes, when called upon to play, whether player 1 has played his unique 
equilibrium strategy a is an important difference and not a mere “presentation effect”. It 
is having this information that causes the non-existence of sequential equilibria in G1 . 
As a result, the example consisting of G1  and G3  define a candidate to disprove the 
sufficiency of the normal form principle in GT2 . 
 
 
4. Result III: neither perfect nor proper implies sequential 
 
Since each player has one information set in G1 , Selten’s (1975, p. 38) perfect equilibria 
can be obtained from the normal form representation N1  of G1  by considering sequences 
of completely mixed strategy profiles. Specifically, for s ∈  {a, b, c, d, e, f}, let ε s (with 
0 < ε s < ½) be the minimum probability with which s has to be played in N1 . Then 
player 2’s only lexicographic best reply consists of playing d with probability 1 – ε c. 
Given this, player 1’s best reply is to play a with probability 1 – ε b. And given this, 
player 3’s best reply is to play e with probability 1 – ε f. Thus, the only equilibrium that 
can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of (perturbed) completely mixed strategies in 
which players play best replies is (a, d, e). This means that G1  and N1  have only one 
perfect equilibrium. Moreover, given that every player has exactly two pure strategies in 
N1 , the set of Myerson’s (1978) proper equilibria of N1  coincides with the set of perfect 
equilibria. The following result summarizes these conclusions. − 5−  
Remark 4.1. Strategy profile (a, d, e) is: (i) the only perfect equilibrium of G1 ; (ii) the 
only perfect equilibrium of N1 ; and (iii) the only proper equilibrium of N1 . 
 
Proposition 4.2. A perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with lexicographic utilities 
need not be a sequential equilibrium of the game. 
 
Proposition 4.3. A proper equilibrium of the normal form of an extensive game with 
lexicographic utilities need not be sequential in all extensive games with that normal 
form. 
 
Proposition 4.2 follows from Remarks 2.2 and 4.1(i). By Proposition 4.3, which follows 
from Remarks 2.2 and 4.1(ii), in GT2 , properness in the normal form does not embody 
sequential rationality in the extensive form: an extensive game may have an empty set 
of sequential equilibria but its normal form representation may have a non-empty set of 
proper equilibria. Note that in every perturbed game of N1 , player 2’s only best reply is 
d; if d is played with sufficiently high probability, player 1’s only best reply is a; and if 
a is played with sufficiently high probability, player 3’s only best reply is e. Hence, {(a, 
d, e)} is a stable set of equilibria of N1 . These three results seem to indicate that, in the 
lexicographic case, perturbing a game to find a solution for the game itself may not be 
appropriate: in G1 , the solution-concepts of perfect equilibria, proper equilibria and 
stable sets of equilibria fail to recognize the unreasonability (if sequential rationality is 





For comparison, the referee suggests analyzing an expected utility version of G1 . 
Consider, for instance, the extensive game G2  represented as Figure 2, where ω  > 1 is an 
arbitrarily large real number. This game has two types of equilibria. Every equilibrium 
σ  of the first type is such that σ a = σ e = 1 and 0 ≤ σ c ≤  ½ and the only equilibrium τ  = 
(τ a, τ c, τ e) of the second type satisfies τ a = (1 + 2ω ) / (1 + 6ω ), τ c = (1 + 2ω ) / 4ω  and τ e 
= ω  / (1 + ω ). Whereas no equilibrium of the first type is sequential, τ  is a sequential 
equilibrium. When ω  is infinitely large, every equilibrium of the first type remains an 
equilibrium but τ  approaches (⅓, ½, 1), which is not an equilibrium. In addition, by the 
same arguments as in Section 4, (a, d, e) is the only perfect equilibrium of G2  and the 
only proper equilibrium of its normal form representation. Therefore, when ω  is 
unbounded, G2  has a non-empty set of perfect equilibria but empty sets of sequential 
and sequentially rational equilibria. − 6−  
Since Fishburn’s (1972) equilibrium existence problem stems from the introduction of 
non-standard utilities, Skala (1974, pp. 77-79; 1975, pp. 111-114) suggests as a solution 
to allow non-standard probability weights; see Skala’s (1974, p. 79) Theorem 13 or 
Skala’s (1975, pp. 113-114) Theorem 5. Skala’s solution amounts in G2  to consider τ  
itself an admissible strategy profile, so that player 3, for instance, can ascribe 
probability ω  / (1 + ω ) to e, where ω  is an infinitely large number. 
 
This extension is analogous to the mixed strategy extension applied to standard games 
without pure strategy equilibria. Rajan (1998) presents an extension of GT1  when 
players can believe that opponents may tremble with infinitesimal probability (with an 
infinitesimal number represented by a sequence of real numbers tending to zero); see 
also Hammond (1999). Skala’s approach seems then to resolve the difficulties of games 
like G2 : if unbounded payoffs are allowed then allow as well unbounded probabilities 
(which is what makes it possible for player 2 to be indifferent at his information set). It 
is nonetheless not obvious that such an approach is equally helpful to deal with the 
difficulties arising in games like G1 , because no number (real or infinitesimal) ascribed 
as a probability to either e or f can make player 2 indifferent between c and d at his 
information set. 
 
Being the introduction of lexicographic utilities the source of the problem, the referee 
suggests introducing the lexicographic beliefs proposed by Blume, Branderburger and 
Dekel (1991), who use them to characterize perfect and proper equilibria. Lexicographic 
beliefs are vectors of probability distributions that are interpreted as the players’ first-
order, second-order and higher order conjectures as to how the opponents will play and 
are used lexicographically to determine best replies. So, for instance, player 2 in G1  may 
entertain the lexicographic belief in which the first-order belief is that σ a = σ e = 1 will 
be played and the second-order belief that τ a = τ e < 1 will be played. In this case, 
playing d is a best reply to both the first-order and the second-order belief. 
 
The apparent initial unreasonability of equilibrium (a, d, e) may be removed with the 
introduction of lexicographic beliefs for the player with lexicographic utilities. The 
problem is that such beliefs do not make (a, d, e) sequentially rational, if the beliefs that 
must count are those consistent with the reaching of player 2’s information set and with 
the strategy specification for the players that may play after 2’s information set (in the 
case at hand, player 3). This maybe suggests that sequential rationality would have to be 
discarded as a reasonable requirement in GT2  (or completely redefined). But if one is 
willing to reject this principle, why not reconsider the notion of rationality attributed to 
players in GT2 ? Rather than imposing a concept of rationality in every conceivable − 7−  
game situation, why not adapt the concept of rationality to the specific game situation? 
Specifically, in G1 , when called upon to play, player 2 must decide whether or not 
running the risk of obtaining (0, 0) just to achieve the infinitesimal improvement from 
(1, 1), which is what he can ensure himself by choosing d, to (1, 2). This situation 
would then point to a notion of cautious rationality that justifies playing d regardless of 
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